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[So F. No. 17042. In Bank. Feb. 1, 1946.]

ANNA RIVIECCIO, Respondent, v. EDNA BOTHAN,
Appellant.
.
~
[1] Divorce-Judg!b.ent-:-Relief from Fraudulent Deeree.-In an

[2]

[3]

[4]

[6]

)
)

action for equitable ~lief from a divorce decree, a finding that
the plaintiff in the divorce action in giving a fictitious address
of the defendant did so..with the fraudulent intent of withholding from the latter n~tice:"f the proceedings was justified
by evidence of plaintiff's familiarity with the streets in the
city in question. his knowledge of the defendant's place of
residence and his addre~sin!l' letters so that thev reached the
defendant.
.
Judgments-Equitable Relief-Fraud.-A willful misstatement
of the defendant's address in an affidavit for publication of
summons is extrinsic fraud justifying setting aside the judgment resulting from proceedinl!S of which the defendant had
no notice
Dlvorce-Judgment-Relief from Fraudulent Decree.-Under
a court's power to purge its records of a judgment procured
by e:ztrinsieally fraudulent acts, it may set aside a divorce
decree 80 procured although one of the spouses has died and
there is not involved any property right in which the 8lll'Vivor
is beneficially interested. In any ease, a property right is involved where the deceased spouse was killed in circumstances
justifying an award under thE' law as to workmen's comll8nsation.
Id.-Judgment - Relief from Fraudulent Decrees-Laches.In a wife's action for equitable relief from a fraudulent divorce
decree, a finding against her laches is supported by evidence
as to her being lulled into a belief that the husband was still
a devoted husband, that she lost trace of him hut constantly
inquired as to his whereabouts, that she continued to write
to him at addresses known to her, many miles distant. and
that she was in i11 health much of the time.
megitimacy-Issue of Void Marriap.-A decree setting aside
a fraudulent divoreE' decre(' does not bastardizE' a child of the

[6] What constitutes a marriage within a legitimation statute,
note, 84 AL.B. 499. See, also, 18 Oal.Jur. 922; 7 Am.Jm. 829.
Melt. Dig. References: [1, S, 4, '7,] Divorce and Separation,
§l27(S); [2) Judgments, § 251(8); [6] Dlegitimacy, 16; [6]
Wormen's Compensation, § 49; [8] Workmen'. Compensation, 160.
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divorced husband born aftpT the divorce and before his marriage to the mother.
[6] Workmen's Oompensation-Dependents-Ohildren.-The rights
of a child born after a father's fraudulent procurement of a
divorce and before his: marriage to the mother include any
rights of 8: legitima, child in death beneflts ~antpd nndpT the
Workmen's Corn~n!'ation Law
[7] Divorce - Jud~nt - Relief from Fraudulent Decrees-Parties.-In an action to set aside a fraudulently procured divorce
decree, a child born to the f<h-mer husband after the divorce
and prior to his marriage t~ the mother is not an indispensable
party, since the ahild is legitimate and possesses all the rights
of a legitimate to death benefits awardable under the Workmen's Compensation Law.
[8] Workmen's Oompensation - Dependents - Wife.-A share of
the death benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Law
may be made to a woman married to a man after his fraudulent procurement of a divorce, irrespective of the validity of
her marriage, on a determination that she was dependent for
her support on decedent and in good faith lived in his household as his wife.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the·
City and County of San Francisco. Robert L. McWilliams,
Judge. Aftirmed.
Action for declaratory relief and to have a decree of divorce
set aside. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.
Lemuel Dalton Sanderson for Appellant.
Leon Prescott and Charles Bagby for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Giovanni Rivieccio died on December 23,
1940, in Oakland from injuries receiyed in an accident while :
driving a truck of his employer. Plaintiff contends that she I
is his widow and in thiR action for declaratory relief praYll
that a final decree of diverce entered in his favor of th~Ji1
Superior Court of San Francisco be set aside.
;1
The decedent married plaintiff in Quincy, Massachusetts.':j
on August 6, 1924. They lived together, first in Quincy and·,
later in Italy. In March. 1928, plaintiff returned to Quincy}
with the consent of her husband. He stayed in Italy because!
he dill not have a permit to reenter the United St..'\tes. It wasJ
agreed, however, that he would join her as soon as po88l"ble.'!
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He went from Italy to Australia and, between 1928 and 1935,
worked as a steward on ships operating between Sydney and
San Francisco. At Sydpey he met defendant and became the
father of a child borp t'o her in 1930. On December 19. 1932.
he filed an action /tJf divorce against plaintiff in the Superior
Court of San Francisco. Summons was served by puhlil"ation
and mail, based on Rivieccio's affidavit that "th(> last known
place of residence of defElll~ant was an(l is Hancock and
Water Streets. Quincy. M~ssachusctts." On th(> elate that
the order for publication was made. Rivieccio's attorney
mailed a copy of the ~ummons and comnlaint to .. Annn Zaccordelli Rivieccio . . . at Hancock Ilnd Water !=!trep,ts. Quincy,
Mas..c:;achusetts." Rivieccio also stnteo in his affioavit that
he believed he had u good CflllS(, of action and incorporated his
verified complaint in hi" Ilffidavit. The complaint alleged:
"That plaintiff ar.d defend:lIIt senarllted from each other on
or about the 14th day of May. 1927. when ~he d(>.c:;erte(l him.
• • . That heret(Jfore. t.o wit. more t.han one year last past immediately prior to the commencement of thif/ RCtion. (lefendant wi11fully deserted and abandone(l nlaint.iff. by voluntarily
separatinl? herself from pJaintiff with the intention of deserting' and abandoninl? him. al?RinRt his will an(l consent. 1'hat
said desertion now cont.inue.c: Rno has unint.errnpt.edly continued for morp than one :veal' last paRt immeoiatelv prior to
the commencement of this action against his will an(l consent!'
There was no appearance on behlllf of the wife. an(l on
April 5, 1933. Rivieecio was granted an interloC'utory decree.
The final decree was entered on Anril 10. 1934. On September 17. ]934. Rivieccio marrif'd defendant in Australia. and
two months later he therE' adonte(l th(> ('hiM horn hf'Tore the
marriage. Shortly thereaft.er t.hey 1111 carne t.o San Francisco
where they lived t.o(!ether unt.il (le('e(lf'nt.'s de.ath. The t.rial
court annulled the divorcf' decree and declared that plaintiff is
the survivinl? widow of Giovanni Rivieccio. Defendant appeals.
The trial court found: "That the affidavit for publication of
summons filed by Giovanni Riyieccio ..• was a fraud upon
this plaintiff and upon t.he Raid Superior Court. and that the
Decree of Divorce . . . was obtained by meant'! of fraud on
said Court and upon the plaintiff . . . . That plaintiff herein
never deserted decedent and that the allegation in !mid complaint for divorce that plaintiff herein hM deserted decedent
on or about May 14, 1927 ••• is not true, and was and is

)
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wholly and willfully false, and was known to decedent to be
false and fraudulent when made by him. That said allegation
of desertion . . . is wholly inconsistent with the various let·
ters written by decedent to plaintiff from December, 1928. to '
September 30. 1930. . . . That Hanco<,k and Water Streets
in the City of Quincy.-, M!?sHachusettR. are puhlic thorough.
fare.~ and do not in~I"!'loict: that plaintiff herein never lived
on either of said streets, and that both of said street!o1 are 10- '
cated at considerable dilltance from where plaintiff re!o1ided in
said city. That said city of.. ~ncy. at the time plaintiff
herein and decedent re..'1ided therein M husband and wife, had
a population of approximately 44.000: that decedent had
lived in, around and about said city for a considerable period
of time and was familiar with the Rtreet.'1 and thoroughfares
thereof. That at divers times after plaintiff herein returned
to said Quincy. and at the time of the filing of decedent's
complaint and affidavit for divorce and at the time of the
entry of the Interlocutory and Final Decrees of Divorce. and
for a considerable time thereafter, plaintiff and decedent were
in written communication with each other. and that deceden~
knew where plaintiff re..'1ided and that decedent never ad~
dressed plaintiff at Hancock and Water Streets. Quincy;'
Massachusetts. and plaintiff never received any correspon~i~
enca from any person addressed to her at Hancock a!¥l'
Water, or Hancock and Water Streets. Quincy. Massach~~
' J'"'1
setts• "
I~
[1] Defendant contends that the finding of ext~~
fraud, requisite to warrant an attack in equity on a fina):
judgment, was not supported by the evidence. In the lig~f
of the facts that Rivieccio was familiar was the streets of:.
Quincy, Massachusetts. that he knew where plaintiff residectl
and that until September. 1930. he addressed his letters .uri
such a manner that they reached her, the trial court was justi.:'
fied in finding that he gave the flctitiou!l addr~ with '~i;
fraudulent intent of withholding from plaintiff notice of~J
divorce proceedings. [I] It ill settled that a willful ~
statement of the defendant's address in an affidavit for pubU!\
cation of snmmon..'1 is extrimric fraud and justifles setting aSl~'
the judgment resulting from proceedin~ of which defend ..:
did not have notice. (Aldrich v. Aldrich, 203 Cal. 433.: :
[264 P. 754]; Stern v. Judson. 163 Cal. 726. 735 [127 P.
Doyle v. Hampton, 159 Cal. 729. 733 r116 P. 391: pars~..
WeiI,l44 Cal. 410,419 [77 P.1007] i Dunlap v. Steere, 9~._,: .
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344, 347 [28 P. 563, 27 AmJ:'t.Uep. 143, 16 L.R.A. 361] j
Wells v. Zenz, 83 Cal.App. 137, 142 [256 P. 484]; W~1liams v.
Williams, 57 Cal.App. 36 [206 P. 650].)
[3] Defendant contends that a Nuit in equity to set aside
a divorce decree cannot be maintained after the death of one
spouse unless it appears that the divorce decree or the subsequent action to set' it aside involved some property right
in which the su~ving spouse is beneficially interested. A
court, however, has autHority to purge its own records and
may set aside a judgment at any time when it appears that
the court has been imposed. upon by extrinsically fraudulent
acts. (McGuinness v. Superior GOU1·t, 196 Cal. 222, 234 [237
P. 42, 40 A.L.R. 1110]; Tom~ v. Tomb, 120 Cal.App. 438,
442 [7 P.2d 1104]; Britton v. Bryson, 216 Cal. 362, 369 [14
P.2d 502); Aldrich v. Aldrich, supra, 437.) The court's power
in this respect is not dependent on whether property rights
are involved. (See Tomb v. Tomb, supra, at p. 442.) Moreover, a property interest is involved in this proceeding. Plaintiff's allegation that decedent was killed as the result of an
accident arising out of and in the course of his employment
is admitted by defendant. Claims for a death benefit may
therefore he made under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
and in making its award the Industrial Accident Commission
will take into consideration the marital relationship of the
decedent to each of the parties herein.
[4] Defendant also contends that plaintiff was not diligent in discovering the fraud and that since the interests of
defendant and her child have intervened, plaintiff should
be barred from attacking the divorce decree. The existence
of laches ill determined by the trial court in the light of the
facts and circumstances of the particular case. (Austin v.
Hallmark O~1 Co., 21 Ca1.2d 718, 734 [134 P.2d 777] j Fry
v. Board of Ed1tcation, 17 Ca1.2d 753, 761 [112 P.2d 229].)
The trial court in the present case found that "plaintiff herein
is not, nor has she been, guilty of laches or any lack of diligt'.nce in instituting the above entitled action." The record
discloses ample evidence to support this finding. Plaintiff
testified that before and after the divorce proceedings her
husband lulled her into the belief that he was still a devoted
husband, and that she later lost trace of him but constantly
made inquiries of relatives and friends as to his whereabouts.
She continued to write to her husband at the address known

I
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to her in Australia and one known to her in San Francisco,
but received no response to her letters. She was separated
by many miles from San Frabcisco and was in ill health from
1:131 until 1937. (See AJdrich v. Aldrich, 203 Cal. 433, 437
[264 P. 754].)
[5] The judgment annulling the divorce decree will not
make defendant's clilld illegitimate, nor will it necessarily
entail for defendant the hardship that she envisages. The
child will not be deprived of the status of a legitimate child
of the decedent. Under section 85 of the Civil Code "The
issue of a marriage which~ is void . . . is legitimate" while
under section 215 of that code" A ehild born before wedlock
becomes legitimate by the subsequent marriage of its parents."
Such statute~ "remove the stain and disabilities of bastardy"
(Goodman v. Goodman, 150 Va. 42, 45 [142 S.E. 412]) not'
only from children born after the void marriage of their
parents or before their valid marriage, but also from children
born, as defendant's child, before the invalid marriage of
their parents. (Bates v. Meade, 174 Ky. 545 [192 S.W. 666];
Goodman v. Goodman, supra; Olinton Oounty Natl. Bk. & Tr.
00. v. Todhunter, 43 Ohio App. 289 [183 N.E. 88] ; see OarroU
v. Oarroll, 20 Tex. 731, 732, 746; 84 A.L.R. 499; 6 So.Cal.
L.Re\'. 338.) [6J The rights of defendant's child include
any rights that a legitimate child has in a death benefit
that may be granted to decedent's dependents under the
Workmen's Compensation Law. (Lab. Code, §§ 4703, 3501.)
[7] Since the present proceeding will not affect the child's
status, it follows that the child is not an indispensable party.
(See Bank of Oalifornia v. Superior Oourt, 16 Ca1.2d 516, I
521 [106 P.2d 879].)
I
[8] Defendant's right to share in a death benefit under
the Workmen's Compensation Law does not depend on the' '.
validity of her marriage. Defendant will be entitled to compensation should the Industrial Accident Commission deter-:
mine that she was dependent for her support upon decedent
and in good faith lived in his household as his wife. (Mac- '
Arthur v. Industrial Ace. Oom., 220 Cal. 142 [29 P.2d 846];;
Harlan v. Indust"ial Ace. Oom., 194 Cal. 352, 364 [228 P.',
654]; Moore Shipbuilding Oorp. v. Industrial Ace. Oom.,·:
185 Cal. 200, 205 [196 P. 257, 13 A.L.R. 676] ; Temescal Rock'
00. v. Industrial Ace. Oom., 180 Cal. 637 [182 P. 447, 13,
A.L.R. 683); DeFreece v. Industrial Ace. Oom., 26 CaI.App.~
2d 584, 587 [80 P.2d 129]; Louden v. Industrial Ace. Oom., i
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105 Cal.App. 65, 69 l286 P. 10i,5J.) "The dependency of
the claimant is the true basis of his right to recover compensation rather than blood or marriage. Relationship is really
only evidence of depengency." (Harlan v. Industrial Ace.
Com., supra, at p. 364.) Similarly, in passing upon any claim
that plaintiff may mlke for compensation and in detennining
under sectioll 4704 of the Labor Code whether to assign any
part of its award to any on~ or more of the dependents in
accordance with their respecttve needs, the Industrial Accident Commission may consider the fact that plaintiff lived
separately from her husband and was not supported by him
for a period exceeding twelve years.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer,
J., and Spence, J., concurred.
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